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main objects of financial risk contagion in the Internet Finance network. 
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control of the Internet Finance system, and points out the reasons why 
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a research model which is still in its infancy, hoping to open up new 
prospects and directions for us to understand the cascading behaviors of 
Internet Finance risks. 
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Highlights
• Construct a complex network with the risk elements of Internet Finance, and propose a systemic risk contagion system based on Internet
Finance, traditional Finance and supervision.
• Propose the comprehensive importance, contagion intensity and vulnerability sensitivity of Internet Finance risk factors, and describes the
contagion cascade behavior in the system.
• Use topological images to predict the possibility of Internet Finance inducing systemic risk, and to judge other potential risks of systemic risk.
Abstract
Internet Finance is a new financial model that applies Internet technology to payment, capital borrowing and lending and transaction processing.
In order to study the internal risks, this paper uses the Internet Finance risk elements as the network node to construct the complex network of
Internet Finance risk system. Different from the study of macroeconomic shocks and Finance institution data, this paper mainly adopts the
perspective of complex system to analyze the systematic risk of Internet Finance. By dividing the entire financial system into Internet Finance
subnet, regulatory subnet and traditional financial subnet, the paper discusses the relationship between contagion and contagion among different
risk factors, and concludes that risks are transmitted externally through the internal circulation of Internet Finance, thus discovering potential
hidden dangers of systemic risks. The results show that the nodes around the center of the whole system are the main objects of financial risk
contagion in the Internet Finance network. In addition, macro-prudential regulation plays a decisive role in the control of the Internet Finance
system, and points out the reasons why the current regulatory measures are still limited. This paper summarizes a research model which is still in
its infancy, hoping to open up new prospects and directions for us to understand the cascading behaviors of Internet Finance risks.
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1.Introduction
Internet Finance is an organic combination of financial industry and Internet information technology. Internet Finance, represented by
mobile payment, online loan, crowdfunding and Internet investment, has developed vigorously and become a hot spot of financial innovation.
The development of Internet Finance not only improves the efficiency of financial resource allocation and realizes the transformation of
residents' savings into capital, but also has certain risk attributes, which has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities. For example, the
innovation vitality of Internet Finance products forces the current relevant laws and regulations still lag behind; The failure of Internet Finance
platform causes frequent capital problems; Some large-scale Internet Finance platforms have gradually become the core of the Internet Finance
system and have the majority of users. The impact of Internet Finance on the economy has an important impact on the robustness of the entire
financial system and the ability to serve the real economy. Therefore, the development of Internet Finance puts forward higher requirements for
financial supervision departments. How to further prevent and resolve Internet Finance risks while promoting the development of Internet
Finance has become an important issue to be solved.
1.1 Related work
According to the existing research, the study of financial systemic risk is usually to analyze the impact of financial institution size, lending
behavior, risk ability and other factors on risk contagion. There are a series of models proposed in the literature, such as the conditional risk
value model (CoVaR) [1], the crisis insurance cost model (DIP)[2], the systematic expected shortage model (SES) [3], and the systematic or
conditional analysis method (SCCA ) [4], etc. However, Internet Finance, as a new financial mode, has to take into account the risk of contagion
and spontaneity, which is more prominent than the traditional financial industry. For example, Lee and Lee empirically studied the existence of
herding behavior in network P2P loans, which indicates that Internet Finance is also full of media attributes, which makes the reputation of
Internet Finance industry to have the ability of fast influence of herding effect [5]. Suresh Kotha et al. studied three types of reputation building
activities using the top 50 pure Internet companies as a sample [6]. Reputation-building activities may be one of the key determinants of the
success of Internet competition.
However, the lack of data limits the study of financial systemic risk to some countries [7, 8]. Moreover, in the face of such a complex
system of financial risks, the perspective of financial institutions' business transactions or macroeconomic pressures has been stretched.
Therefore, the study of systemic risk requires a more extensive approach, that is, the use of interactions in the financial system to study systemic
risk [9-11]. Some scholars have showed that the risk transfer and the evolution mechanism in the system by constructing the network form [12].
The network topology is used to solve the problems in the financial network. Systemic risk drivers, applied to cross-country exposure data in
BIS databases, Solorzano-Margain et al. use network theory to describe the contagion of financial crisis [13]. Amini and Minca proposed a
framework to test the risk of large-scale cascading crisis in financial network and studied the contagion problem in financial network [14]. Alex
et al. concluded that risk mitigation and optimal repair were largely dependent on the interdependent network structure, and the problem of
monitoring risk was solved through the network dependence perspective[15].
1.2 Method
In many types of network construction methods, the cross penetration and close combination of complex network theory between different
disciplines have proved its excellent ability in analyzing and processing complex systems. The technology of network science has been
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successfully applied to the analysis of financial system [16-18]. Based on this, this paper uses complex networks to describe the geometric
properties of Internet Finance risk system, analyzes the formation mechanism of the system and predicts the structural stability of the system,
and then explains the macro and micro characteristics of an Internet Finance system itself. This approach brought great practical significance for
the study of the spread of systemic risks in Internet Finance. Through the theory of complex networks, this paper makes use of the different
inductive factors of Internet Finance risk and its influence relationship, and builds the network step by step, thus exploring the contagion path
and network characteristics under Internet Finance risk. The results show that Internet Finance has the potential to induce systemic risk, and its
important source lies in the external effect caused by the significant risks imposed on the outside world by the core Internet Finance institutions.
In addition, the diffusion mechanism of Internet Finance risk is different from the traditional financial network in the past. The development of
Internet Finance not only improves the efficiency of financial resource allocation and realizes the transformation of residents' savings into capital,
but also has certain risk attributes, which has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities. Stronger core influence and ability to change,
which also puts forward more targeted requirements for regulators. In this paper, the research on Internet Finance based on the theory of
complexity science can become a new idea, new method and new way to realize the unity of micro and macro research on Internet Finance. For
the modern Internet Finance regulation and detection of potential dangers to provide more effective support. The method could also provide
inspirations for other scientific areas, such as death danger from organ failure in Biology, system breakdown risks in Ecology, overload hazard in
computational network.
2. Risk Relationships Build Networks
At present, there are two main methods to construct financial risk contagion network: one is to establish the network according to the
actual lending data or the actual transaction data of payment system between financial institutions [19-22], the other is based on the stock market
information such as stock price, daily rate of return to establish a network [23-25]. According to the statistical characteristics of network
geometry, the complex network models mainly include regular network model, random network model, W-S small-world network model [26]
and B-A scale-free network model [27]. Newman et al. think that complex network is a higher-level relational network composed of multi-level
networks [28]. Anything in real life can be understood as a complex network of different levels. Strogatz shows that a complex network is
composed of interrelated nodes to describe a variety of real complex systems [29]. Based on this, this paper consider the Internet Finance Risk as
a complex system. It uses different risk factors as nodes to construct a network model, and uses the number of connected nodes of risk factors to
predict risk impact ability.
Assume the network feature to be composed of two basic elements: node v and correlation mode e . If V is regarded as the set of v ,
E is regarded as the set of e , and each edge e in E has a pair of points (i,j) corresponding to V . Then the whole network can be
represented by the matrix G(V,E)G  , with elements defined by：
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At the same time, because the complex system is a typical directed network, the matrix can be judged as an asymmetric matrix, which
means:
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The overall importance of a node. Considering the entire Internet Finance risk system, risk factors will not be fixed, but will change with
the development of the Internet. Therefore, it is assumed that at the initial time 0t  , the system has 0m risk factors, and at each subsequent
time interval, node )m(m 0 with degree m will keep changing. The probability of a node with degree mconnecting to other nodes is: )kP i( ,
which is proportional to the degree ik of the original node. In the real Internet Finance system, it is explained as follows: the factor with
stronger risk contagion ability has stronger contagion ability to the outside world, and the risk factor with weaker risk resistance ability is more
likely to be infected.
The probability that a node has a connection edge is:  j)( j
i
i k
k
kP .
This value is defined as the cumulative risk that the node can accumulate when the whole network is attacked, and the ability to infect the
risk to other nodes, which is a comprehensive evaluation of different Internet Finance risk elements.
Similarly, the probability that a node has a continuous edge is:
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This value represents the infection intensity of a node. From the analysis of the evolution mechanism of Internet Finance risks, it is
assumed that there is only one risk source I before the unstable state of the Internet Finance system. If the risk source   will lead to the
subsequent occurrence of other risks, the stronger the influence of risk source   is, that is, the higher the )( ikP value is. This indicates that
the more likely a risk source is to play the role of inducing systemic risk in the system, the more attention it needs to be paid. On the contrary, a
low value indicates that a node has a low influence on the outside world.
However, the true contagion of risk sources must also take into account the vulnerability of other nodes in the Internet Finance system.
Therefore, there is also a need for the probability of nodes being connected:
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This value represents the sensitivity of a node to attack. The larger the value is, the more vulnerable the node is to other risks, and the less
vulnerable to external infection.
It is found that the financial risk of Internet has local aggregation in the process of contagion, which is shown by the fact that part of the
network is closely connected, and part of the connection is sparse, that is, the network can be divided into multiple subnetworks. This
phenomenon exists in many real networks, such as the conclusion of "community structure" proposed by Newman [30, 31] that the systemic risk
of finance has the nature of multi-layer network. Therefore, this paper divides the systemic risk of Internet Finance into three layers: Internet
Finance network, regulatory network and traditional financial network. Integrating the characteristics of Internet Finance and traditional
financial industry, this paper starts with the three elements of "causes of risk induction", "means of risk regulation" and "path of risk contagion"
in the process of network construction. First of all, we pay attention to the source of systemic risk induced by Internet Finance, and analyze the
risk factors in the whole Internet Finance, and study the cause of risk contagion and the path of contagion. Secondly, considering the business
activities between regulatory authorities and Internet Finance, capital flow and risk exposure, using the flow relationship between the two,
regulatory intensity, regulatory costs and other constraints to build a complex system of regulatory networks. Finally, the paper considers the
risks of traditional finance to construct traditional finance Subnet. Therefore, the network of Internet Finance risk system with multi-source risk
superposition and multi-risk level can be represented synthetically.
The core mechanism of network construction in this paper is to judge whether there is a direct inductive relationship between different risk
factors, and if there is direct infection, the directed routes of both infectious parties will be established. For the judgment of inducement and
trigger between risk factors, this paper mainly through the history of the Internet industry and the existing literature theory synthesis. The
conduction relationship between factors is shown in Fig. 1 below.
Fig.1.Represents the structural relationship between two risk network layers. In the graph, node 1 has a risk contagion in its subnetwork, and node 1 is also
associated with node 2 and node 3 in another subnetwork, so the association between different subnets is based on the interconnection between nodes. In reality, the internal
transaction disorder of an Internet Finance platform will not only cause the crisis of the Internet Finance platform itself, but also affect the final settlement bank.
After the analysis of the network structure, the graph layout algorithm can show the scattered information in a clear way, and meet the
corresponding aesthetic standards. Therefore, this paper adopts two force guided placement algorithms, Force Atlas and Fruchterman Reingold,
which mimic the gravity and repulsion of the physical world, automatically layout until the force is balanced, and make the graph more compact
and more readable. After the complex network connection is transformed into a more beautiful network layout, it is convenient to observe the
overall structure of the network and its automorphism characteristics.
3. Internet Finance Subnet
It should be emphasized that it is a complicated work to build a network for the entire Internet Finance risk system. The Internet Finance
system not only involves its own risks, but also has a close relationship with commercial banks and regulators. We first determined the
hierarchical network construction idea of the entire Internet Finance system, and then integrated a large number of literature, and through the
investigation of actual bank workers to determine whether there is a correlation between risk factors and risk factors.
Comprehensive financial risk and Internet Finance risk research literature is provided by a series of papers [32-37]. Internet Finance risk
mainly includes technical risk, operational risk and legal risk, credit risk and business risk. In this paper, the main types of risk in Internet
Finance are decomposed into several important subdivision risks to construct the network of risk factors.
3.1 Technical risk
Technical risk include: operating system vulnerability factor, virus Trojan factor, internal information disclosure factor, identity forgery
login factor, network transmission factor, server maintenance factor and natural disaster damage factor. Like the risk of traditional finance, each
subdivision risk factor in Internet Finance is transmitted to each other [14]. For example, the operating system vulnerability will lead to Trojan
horse virus intrusion, resulting in server malfunction and internal information disclosure, network transmission problems will lead to virus
Trojan horse attacks and internal information disclosure. Improper server maintenance will cause network transmission problems and so on [38].
From the perspective of external effects, the type of technical risk will have cross-class contagion with other types of risk, mainly reflected in the
impact on the type of operational risk and the type of legal risk. For example, operating system vulnerabilities, network transport problems, etc.
can lead to malicious intrusion (operational risk type). Internal information disclosure may lead to the misuse of personal information (legal risk
type) and user prosecution (legal risk type).
3.2 Operational risk
Operational risk mainly exists in the business model of Internet Finance, including internal operational risk factor, malicious intrusion risk
factor, user accidental operation risk factor, service provider operating risk factor, outsourcing technology risk factors and cooperative
development risk factors [35]. Part of the subdivision risk factors will be transmitted to each other. For example, service providers, outsourcing
technology, or the process of cooperative development may lead to the deterioration of relationships, which may lead to the risk of malicious
intrusions by partners. From the external impact, the type of operational risk will be cross-class contagion with other risk types, mainly reflected
in the type of technical risk, legal risk type, industry. Service risk type, enterprise operation risk type. For example, after disputes that occur
between Internet Finance enterprises, service providers, outsourcing partners, due to the limitation of the completeness of existing laws, it is not
possible to effectively and timely investigate responsibilities, which may force the business development, reduce users' trust in it, and cause
pressure on the operation of the whole enterprise.
3.3 Legal risk
Legal risk includes incomplete information disclosure risk factor, abuse of personal information risk factor, illegal financing risk factor,
legal protection completeness risk factor, illegal business risk factor, users sue risk factors and national policy risk factors. Subdivision risk
factors can be mutually transmitted. For example, the perfection of laws and regulations makes it impossible for Internet Finance companies to
cover up their misuse of personal information, and they may also be subject to public relations crisis and user prosecution after the incident is
exposed. From the external impact, the type of legal risk and other types of risk will be cross-class contagion, mainly reflected in the type of
credit risk, business Risk type, enterprise operation risk type. For example, illegal Internet Finance platforms that illegally finance may have
their own business model known as "Ponzi schemes". Compared with traditional finance, enterprises operate in a way that lacks industry norms
and resists capital flows. Market cycle and interest rate risk ability is very low, platform easy credit breach risk.
3.4 Credit risk
Credit risk is ubiquitous in Internet Finance and is an important part of systematic risk prevention [19, 40]. This type of risk includes term
mismatch risk factor, default contract risk factor, false publicity risk factor, etc. Platform running risk factor. Subdivision risk factors can be
mutually transmitted. For example, Internet Finance products have a long term of investment assets and a short period of liabilities, which makes
the financial products of Internet Finance enterprises unable to pay in time, thus creating the risk of term mismatch, which is the most general
evolution into credit default. From the external impact, credit risk type and other types of risk will be cross-class contagion, the main Reflected
in the legal risk type, business risk type, enterprise operation risk type. For example, after the risk of breach of contract on Internet Finance
platform, there may also be prosecution or punishment by regulators, which reduces the confidence of Internet Finance business in the user's
heart and thus affects the development of business activities [6].
3.5 Business risk
Business risk includes capital flow risk factor, market cycle risk factor, interest rate risk factor, user preference risk factor and investor
relationship risk factor. Subdivision risk factors will have a certain degree of mutual transmission. For example, the inability of Internet Finance
enterprises to obtain enough funds at reasonable cost and in a timely manner to cope with asset growth or the payment of maturing debts,
resulting in the risk of a chain break of funds, is likely to be caused by investor relationships, it is also possible that interest rate risk, market
cycle brought about. From the external impact, the type of business risk will be cross-class contagion with other types of risk, mainly reflected in
the type of credit risk. Enterprise operating risk type. The performance of Internet Finance, for example, affects the health of its capital flows
because many platforms attract users in the form of finance-subsidy in the process of doing business. This makes the platform inside the flow of
capital health is extremely important.
3.6 Management and strategy risk
In addition, this paper also considers the healthy management and strategic choice of internet enterprises. No Internet Finance enterprise
can avoid its own risks in operation management, expansion and strategic choice. Acquaah studied the importance of the business experience of
business managers and the ability of community leaders in the use of resources [41]. Laeven & Levine made an empirical evaluation on the bank
risk bearing theory, equity structure and national bank supervision [42]. It shows that the influence of supervision on bank risk depends on the
corporate governance structure. In the process of regulating Internet Finance platforms, the marginal effect of risk is real and will change with
the change of equity concentration. If the ownership structure of an Internet Finance platform is very unreasonable and CEO has great influence,
the platform is very vulnerable to the influence of the personal will of CEO in the process of carrying out its business.
The healthy operation management and strategic choice of Internet enterprises mainly include the innovation vitality of enterprises, the
competition mode in the industry, the public image of enterprises, the relationship of employees, the supplement of talents and posts, the salary
level of employees, the decision-making of leadership, equity allocation and group parent-subsidiary relationship. These factors often cannot be
quantified, and many Internet enterprises are difficult to collect relevant data, so it is rarely considered by the research of macro Internet Finance
risk. By synthesizing the development of the Internet industry and existing research, this paper determines whether there is direct inducement
between the risk factors, so that this kind of risk can be included in the financial network layer of the Internet analysis. According to the
relationship between the subdivision risk, the subdivision risk factors will infect each other. For example, the leadership decision will affect the
corporate image, talent introduction and salary level, and the salary level will affect the degree of talent introduction, and ultimately affect the
innovation power of the Internet Finance platform. From the external impact, the types of operational risk mainly focus on the impact of
leadership decisions. For example, whether the leadership and management will have the risk of internal operations, whether there will be illegal
business and illegal financing decisions. The number and attributes of the subdividing risk under each type are shown in Table 1. In the Internet
Finance subnet, force atlas model is used to visually arrange the entire network according to the sizes of )kP i( ,

)kP i( and

)P(ki of
different risk nodes, as shown in Fig. 2 (a), (b) and (c).
Table 1
Six types of risks of Internet Finance are labeled as A (Technical risk type), B (Operation risk type), C (Legal risk type), D (Credit risk type), E
(Business risk type). F (Operations and Strategic Options). Six types of risk were subdivided into a number of independent risks and labeled as A1,
A2, A3 ……, F9
Node name Number Node name Number Node name Number
Category A: Technical risks
System Vulnerability A1 Virus Trojan Horse A2 Internal Information Leakage A3
Identity Forgery Landing A4 Network Transmission A5 Server Maintenance A6
Natural Disaster Damage A7
Category B: operational risk
Built-in Function B1 Malicious Intrusion B2 User Unexpected Operation B3
Service Provider Operation B4 Outsourcing Technology B5 Cooperate B6
Category C: Legal risks
Information Disclosure C1 Individual Privacy C2 Illegal Financing C3
Incomplete Legal Protection C4 Illegal Operation C5 User Prosecution C6
National Policy C7
Category D: Credit risk
Term Mismatch D1 Breach of Contract D2 False Propaganda D3
Platform Running D4
Category E: Business risks
Capital Flow E1 Market Cycle E2 Interest Rate Exposure E3
User Preference E4 Investor Relationship E5
Category F: Operation Management and Strategic Choice
Innovation Power F1 Competition Mode F2 Corporate Image F3
Employee Relationship F4 Talent Introduction F5 Salary Level F6
Leadership Decision-Making F7 Equity Allocation F8 Parent Subsidiary Company F9
(a)The overall importance of each node (b)The infection intensity of each node (c)The attack sensitivity of each node
Fig. 2 Comparison of the importance, contagion intensity, and sensitivity of each node in the Internet Finance subnet
The )kP i( of each node in Fig.2(a) is used as a measure of the comprehensive influence ability of nodes, which aims to highlight the
factors that occupy important influence in the financial risk system of Internet. The images show that F7 nodes (Leadership Decision factors) are
the most influential in the financial risk layer of the Internet, and the most influential of the six types of risk are the F node (Healthy Operation
and Strategic Choice). The second is E node (Business risk category), C node (Legal risk category), D node (Credit risk category), B node
(Operation risk category), A node (Technical risk category).
The

)P(ki shows the size of the link that each node emits, the intensity of contagion to the outside world. The six risk classes play a
pivotal role in this network, and the F7 node (leadership decision factor) remains the largest node. B1 node (internal operating factor) and E3
node (Interest Rate risk factor) showed stronger infectivity than other nodes. The internal operational risk can be controlled by the internal
mature management system of the financial enterprise. Only the interest rate risk needs to be regulated by the main body of supervision in the
macro economy. However, the interest rate of a country affects the economic level of the whole market and is inevitable.
The

)kP i( of each node in Fig.2(c) represents the sensitivity of a node to attack. The actual meaning is the number of risks
transmitted directly to the node after the occurrence of systemic risk. The order of six risk classes from big to small is: node F (Operational
Strategy), E node (Business risk category), C node (Legal risk category), D node (Credit risk category), B node (Operational risk category) and
A node (Technical risk category). Compared with Fig. 4, the network is more specific to the vulnerability and vulnerability of each node. The
risk within the Internet enterprise remains the highest degree of connectivity It shows that Internet companies are more sensitive to risks and are
more susceptible to other risks, thus triggering new risks.
From the practical point of view, the leadership decision making node, as the most important node, is not only the access point of many
factors, but also the point of actively radiating links to other risk factors, which is due to the Internet Finance platform, whether it is in the
development of business. The signing of contracts, the choice of financing or, for example, the use of funds, the management of enterprises, the
use of user information is all decided by the corporate leadership. On the contrary, the change of laws and regulations, the change of market
cycle and the information brought by technology also greatly influence the judgment and the choice of the future development direction made by
the enterprise leaders. From a micro perspective, because the leadership represents Internet Finance enterprises, so the Internet Finance industry
should be made up of one Internet Finance platform after it has been subdivided. In this way, the Internet Finance industry is not only itself a part
of the network that spreads risks to the outside. At the same time, each platform is also vulnerable to the risk of other platforms in the industry
contagion.
4. Regulatory Subnet
The network analysis of Internet Finance is a complex systematic project, which needs not only the internal factors of the Internet Finance
industry, but also the regulatory model. Now, the cost of collecting regulatory information from the Internet industry is very high and difficult for
regulators. However, considering that the Internet industry has obvious Matthew effect and long tail effect, the more important platform in the
whole industry system can not only control the supervision cost and improve the regulation efficiency, but also select the more important
platform in the whole industry system as the regulatory research object. And can play a role in controlling systemic risk [20]. This section marks
the entire regulatory type as node G. The specific influencing factors under this type are: scale access, technology access, business license, exit
license, supervision, capital supervision, public opinion supervision, legal perfection, supervision subject, central bank, local government. By
analyzing the direct contagion ability of each specific factor to other risks, the risk transfer path network between the regulatory layer and the
Internet Finance layer is constructed.
In February 2019, China carried out financial regulatory reform, and established the macro-prudential supervision bureau to strengthen
macro-prudential supervision. Its regulatory bodies are supervised by the central bank, the three supervisory commissions and local authorities at
two levels. Local supervision can ensure the implementation of Internet Finance business with local characteristics under macro supervision,
which not only protects the stability of the whole market but also facilitates the innovation of Internet Finance. Therefore, the regulatory subject
should be the core of the whole regulatory network and control the changes of all regulatory factors [35].
The entry, exit, regulation and other regulatory policies of the Internet Finance industry will directly affect the technical risk (category A),
the legal risk (category C), the credit risk (category D), the business risk (category E) of the Internet Finance enterprise, enterprise risk (category
F). For example, Internet Finance companies with insufficient technical depth cannot operate, Internet companies with a certain scale cannot
carry out Internet Finance business, exit needs approval from relevant institutions and so on. Through the means of supervision in this respect,
we can not only prevent excessive monopoly, vicious competition and market failure, but also guarantee the financial safety of those who
participate in network finance investment and financing, and avoid it as far as possible. Network technology, management backward enterprises
into the Internet Finance market.
At present, Internet Finance related law vacancy and regulation lags [43]. The supervision of Internet Finance by relevant departments also
includes dynamic control, such as the continuous improvement of laws and regulations, the dynamic detection of the authenticity of funds and
the timely control of public opinion. Through dynamic supervision, regulators will help to strengthen the supervision of risks, enhance the
integrity of the industry, and thus affect the legal risk (category C), credit risk (category D), business risk (category E) of Internet Finance.
Enterprise risk (category F).
At this stage, there is no capital reserve system in Internet Finance, which, on the one hand, makes banks in an unfair state of competition,
on the other hand, it also makes Internet Finance lack the protection mechanism of the lender of last resort. Once there is a break in the capital
chain, you’ll be caught in an unpayable crisis. Therefore, capital supervision can make Internet Finance maintain a fair competitive market
environment at the macro level, and provide the guarantee of lender of last resort for Internet Finance enterprises through capital supervision.
The number and attributes of the specific impact factors of the regulatory type are shown in Table (2). The visual image of the supervised subnet
is shown in Fig. 3(a), (b) and(c).
Table 2
Regulatory risk is divided into the following subdivision of risk factors, and added to the entire network construction.
Node name Number Node name Number Node name Number
Category G: Regulation
Scale Access G1 Technology Access G2 Business License G3
Withdrawal Permit G4 Supervision Intensity G5 Fund Supervision G6
Public Opinion Supervision G7 The Law G8 Supervising Subject G9
Central Bank G10 Local Government G11
(a)The overall importance of each node (b)The infection intensity of each node (c)The attack sensitivity of each node
Fig. 3 At present, the regulation is not sensitive to the change of Internet Finance, all the regulatory factors are in the low influence, B (operational risk type), E type (business
risk type), category F (risk types of Internet enterprises) and so on cannot be directly linked to regulatory factors. It can be seen that existing regulatory measures cannot
cover all the risks of Internet Finance, such as malicious hacking incidents, different users' preferences for products, employee relations within Internet enterprises, and so on.
5. Traditional Financial Subnet
The traditional financial subnet mainly describes the complex network of Internet Finance and banking. As the central node, the two have
gradually formed the relationship between competition and cooperation in the development. The subnet has four branches: direct generation,
indirect generation, contact infection and non-contact infection.
There is a risk generation mechanism between Internet Finance and traditional finance. Through the Internet lending business, the Internet
fund business, and the Internet payment business, the traditional banks have been impacted by the successful crowding out of commercial banks'
assets, liabilities and intermediary business, resulting in higher operating costs and lower profit levels of the banks. The loss of deposits and the
increase in leverage. The service side of Internet Finance for users has changed the level of money supply and demand and interest rate, which
has an impact on the intermediary variables of macro economy. This led to the expansion of bank credit, the decline in monetary demand, and
the weakening of the effectiveness of macroeconomic controls, leading to a systemic crisis in the banking sector [11, 44].
There is a risk contagion mechanism between Internet Finance and traditional finance. Internet Finance through the channels of capital
exchange generated by cooperation with commercial banks, through the Internet Finance industry platform, based on bank electronic accounts,
deposit accounts, depository accounts, reserve accounts, and so on. The whole industry risk, service object risk, legal supervision risk and
technical operation risk of Internet Finance are transmitted to commercial banks. Internet Finance users continue to grow and gradually become
dependent on the platform. If the payment services provided by the Internet platform are suddenly paralyzed and not repaired in time, the crisis
news passes through the media channels. The herding effect may cause investors to change their psychological expectations, such as cash runs
and other social events [45, 46]. The traditional financial risk type is labeled as H. The numbers and attributes of the specific risk factors are
shown in Table 3. The visual image is shown in Fig. 4.
Table 3
In view of the research of Internet Finance, this paper divides the traditional financial risk types into the
following sub-risks and adds them to the construction of the network.
Node name Number Node name Number Node name Number
Category H: Traditional Financial
Bank Deposit H1 Bank Debt H2 Intermediate Business of Bank H3
Bank Server H4 Insurance H5 Fund H6
Profit H7 Prestige H8
(a)The overall importance of each node (b)The infection intensity of each node (c)The attack sensitivity of each node
Fig. 4 The number of nodes connected between Internet Finance and traditional finance is less than that of other subnets. The two networks
mainly use business risk (category E) and credit risk (category D) as the transmission path. The most prominent is the H4 node (the pressure of
internet banking service). As the final settlement link of Internet Finance transactions, banks play an important role, and the service ability of
internet banking also has a direct impact on the whole Internet Finance business.
6. Systematic risk network
By synthesizing the above network divisions for supervision, Internet Finance, and traditional finance, it can be proved that Internet
Finance risks meet the three conditions: they are composed of core outward diffusion, and each part is mutually transmitted and affected. Each
part has its own unique nature. Thus, it can be seen that the composition of Internet Finance risk is actually a multi-level, outward-spreading
structure, which has the possibility of inducing systemic risk. In addition, in the actual analysis of the risk situation of Internet Finance, we also
have to consider the risks brought by users, the risks brought by domestic environment, and the risks brought by the main types of Internet
Finance services. So this article adds some user factor types (category I), domestic and foreign environment types (category J), Internet Finance
business types (category K). Specific factors and their attributes are shown in Table 4. According to the multi-layer network theory of systemic
risk [30, 31], this paper selects the three-layer subnet constructed for splicing to obtain the network of Internet Finance systemic risk, so as to
better observe the node connection, risk contagion path and system structure in the Internet Finance system. Because of the overlap of nodes and
nodes between the three layer networks, the three layer networks must be combined into a new complex network. Similarly, the size of the )kP i( ,

)( ikP ,

)( ikP data is based on Fruch Visual images of the Terman Reingold model, as shown in Fig. 5 (a), (b), (c).
Table4
User factors, domestic and foreign environment, Internet Finance services node.
Node name Number Node name Number Node name Number
Category I: User factors
Risk Preference I1 Wage Level I2 Level of Consumption I3
Investment Experience I4 Risk Assumption Level I5 Asset Level I6
Bank Credit Evaluation I7 Tax Degree I8 Age I9
Endemic Distribution I10 Local Economy I11
Category J: Domestic and Foreign Environment
Domestic Innovation J1 Foreign Innovation J2 Foreign Trade Level J3
Domestic Industry Level J4 Exchange of Know-how J5 Domestic and Foreign Capital Relations J6
Category K: Internet Finance Services
Payment Service K1 Insurance Services K2 Investment Services K3
Credit Services K4 Money Fund K5
(b)The infection intensity of each node (c)The attack sensitivity of each node
Fig. 5 Network structure Diagram of Internet Finance risk system with three subnets.
From the view of the correlation structure of the Internet Finance risk system, many elements will change with the change of time and
space. For example, the continuous improvement of the regulatory system, the extinction of the old risks and the emergence of new risks. The
emergence of new Internet Finance services, etc. Therefore, the system is dynamic and a complex multivariable system. In order to maintain a
stable state during the continuous evolution of the system, it is necessary to balance the structure of all the components of the system with the
external environment at t time. When the external environment appears random sudden factors and impact on the system, the system will usually
adapt itself, this article will be the Internet Finance system Expressed as:
)],(),,(),,([),( tStEtCtIFS   (4)
),( tIFS  stands for an Internet Finance system at a certain level,  for the system, t for the measuring time, C for the Internet
Finance subnet, E for the regulatory subnet, and S for the traditional financial subnet. In fact, the Internet Finance system adjusts its risk
through feedback mechanism to realize the smooth integration of the three subnets.
The characteristics of systemic risk contagion in Internet Finance are shown in Fig. 6.
(a)The overall importance of each node
Fig. 6 (a) and (b) show that in the whole Internet Finance complex network, the random destruction of nodes outside the system will not lead to the collapse of the whole
system, but there are several core nodes in the Internet Finance risk system. These core important nodes such as G (regulatory control), H (traditional financial risk), F
(operation and strategy) and other. (c) are the degree distribution of each risk factor. The image shows that the network is not a significant scale-free network. Starting with
the second link, the number of nodes begins to rise 20 links are the average of the node links for the entire risk system, before which the image is presented Normal
distribution, after which the image presents a power law distribution.
7. Choice of Investors: Traditional Finance or Internet Finance?
In the entire financial market, there is a business competition between traditional finance and Internet finance. Internet finance provides a
convenient financing platform for both the supply and demand sides of funds, and builds a bridge to improve the efficiency of asset allocation.
However, compared with the long-established traditional finance, the future of Internet finance, which is an emerging industry, is full of
uncertainty. This uncertainty and the external environment formed a joint impact, not only led to regulatory difficulties, but also led to the
investors' decision-making mistakes[46][47]. In the face of convenient services provided by Internet finance, investors often care about risk issues.
It can be seen that risks and benefits determine the competitiveness of traditional finance and Internet finance. In financial markets with high
uncertainties, the trade-off between maximizing expected return and minimizing the risk is one of the main challenges in modeling and decision
making[48][49].
Therefore, we borrowed the mechanism of capital flow and quantitatively studied the internal relations between investors, capital
demanders, traditional finance, and Internet finance in the process of investment and financing, aiming to abstract the competition problem of the
financial industry into the equilibrium problem of the network[50][51]. Through the network analysis method, the trade-off between profit
maximization and risk minimization is judged, and the competition relationship and risk degree between Internet finance and traditional finance
are estimated based on the investor's preference[52][53][54].
7.1 Investor behavior analysis
Most Internet companies pay great attention to business models and business innovations. Focusing on big data processing and user
behavior analysis, they can often achieve accurate business promotion in vertical segments. The Internet financial platform attracts potential
investors in Internet applications such as search engines, social networking, and entertainment by using bonus payment and redemption points.
Defining the amount of funds the investor h has is qhi
1 , the fund owner h invests the funds in an internet financial platform i, so there are
HI links linking the investors and the internet financial platform. The flow of funds on each link qhi
1 is summed to form a vector Q1 ∈ R+
HI.
At this point investors can have the following options:
(1) Investors transfer funds to the Internet financial platform, and the latter directly conducts investment activities, such as Internet P2P
credit.
The Internet financial platform i directly lends the funds to the capital demander k , thus generating IK links between each of them. The
flow of funds on each link is qik
2 , aggregating to form a vector Q4 ∈ R+
IK.
(2) Investors transfer funds to traditional financial platforms, such as bank time deposits and other investment activities.
Investor h chooses to invest his funds in a traditional financial platform j . Therefore, a total of HJ links exist among investors and
traditional financial platforms, and the flow of funds on each link is qhj
1 , aggregating to form a vector Q2 ∈ R+
HJ.
(3) Investors transfer funds to an internet financial platform. At this time, the Internet financial platform plays an intermediate role, and
continues to pool funds into traditional financial platforms and reach the specific capital demand market through traditional finance.
The Internet financial platform i transfers funds of qij
2 to traditional financial platform j for investment. A total of IJ links exist among
Internet finance and traditional finance, and the flow of funds on each link is qij
2, aggregating to form a vector Q3 ∈ R+
IJ . Therefore, the summary
vector of all Internet financial platforms
5Q should be the summation of Q2 ∈ R+
HJ and Q3 ∈ R+
IJ .
7.2 Capital flow and risk function
Since financial instruments such as “leverage investment” are not yet mature in the Internet finance industry, with no specific laws and
regulations on them, this paper assumes the funds used for foreign investment in the Internet financial platform is raised from market. For each
Internet financial platform, the amount of funds flowing out cannot exceed the amount of funds flowing in.
2 2 1
1 1 1
     
J K H
ij ik hi
j k h
q q q i
  
    
. (5)
The definition of ηij
2 indicates the existence of the relationship between the financial business platform i and the traditional financial
platform j, and aggregates the formation of the vector Η3 ∈ R+
IJ ; ηik
2 represents the capital flow relationship between the Internet financial
platform i and the capital demander k , and aggregates to vector H4 ∈ R+
IK . Assume that the strength of these network relationships is in the
interval [0, 1], 0 means that the network relationship between the two does not exist, and 1 represents the closest social network relationship
between the two.
The cost function for the relationship between the Internet financial platform i and the traditional financial platform j is defined as
 2 2 2      ,ij ij ijf f i j  . The cost function for the relationship between the Internet financial platform and the capital demanders is defined as
 2 2 2      ,ik ik ikf f i k  . The cost function for the relationship between investors and internet finance platforms is defined as  1 1 1ˆ    ˆ   ,hhi ihif f h i  .
In order to facilitate the optimization of the solution, the horizontal function of the relationship between the Internet financial platform i
and the traditional financial platform j is defined as  2 2 2      ,ij ij ijv v i j  . The horizontal function of the relationship between the Internet
financial platform and the capital demanders is defined as  2 2 2      ,ik ik ikv v i k  . The horizontal function function for the relationship between the
fund owner and the internet financial platform is defined as  1 1 1ˆ    ˆ   ,hhi ihiv v h i  .
Define cij
2 as the transaction cost function between the Internet financial platform i and the traditional financial platform j (the part of the
Internet financial platform). It is assumed that transaction costs are determined based on each other's trading volume and relationship level:
 2 2 2 2,      ,ij ij ij ijc ic q j  . Transaction cost function between the Internet financial platform i and the capital demander k is defined as
 2 2 2 2,      ,ik ik ik ikc ic q k  . Transaction cost function between the fund owner h and the internet financial platform i is defined as
 1 1 1 1ˆ ,ˆ      ,hi hi h ii hq ic c h  .
Define ci as the conversion cost function of the Internet financial platform i , including the conversion cost of the funds invested by the
recipient of the funds into the traditional financial platform and related financial products required by the capital demanders. Assume that the
conversion cost function is based on the amount of money h=1
H qhi
1  flowing into the Internet financial platform i:  1      i ic c iQ  .
Define eij
2 as an operational risk function between the Internet financial platform i and the traditional financial platform j. The operational
risk function between the Internet financial platform i and the capital demander k is defined as    2 2 2 2 2 2 2      ,ik i ik ik i ik ike a E q b T q i k   .
It is assumed that the operating profit function represents the excess return obtained due to the operational skills of the Internet financial
platform, and the technical penalty function represents the loss caused by the failure of the Internet financial platform equipment, which is borne
by the Internet financial platform itself. For the operational skill coefficient ai
2 of the Internet financial platform, it is only relevant to the
Internet financial platform side. The component Eij
2 of the operational profit function are determined based on the volume of each other's
transactions. For the technical risk factor bi
2 of the Internet financial platform, this coefficient is only relevant to the Internet financial platform.
The component Tij
2 of the technical penalty function are determined based on each other's trading volume:
   2 2 2 2 2 2 2      ,ij i ij ij i ij ije a E q b T q i j   .
Define gij
2 as the credit penalty function between the Internet financial platform i and the traditional financial platform j (the part of the
Internet financial platform that defaults, and thus is undertaken by it). Assume that the credit penalty function has a relationship with both parties
to the transaction, and is determined based on each other's transaction volume and relationship level:  2 2 2 2,      ,ij ij ij ijg g q i j  .The credit penalty
function between the Internet financial platform i and the capital demander k is defined as  2 2 2 2,      ,ik ik ik ikg g q i k  . The credit penalty function
between the fund owner h and the internet financial platform i is defined as  1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ,       ,hhi hi hi ig g q h i  . Define rij2 as risk function between the
Internet financial platform i and the traditional financial platform j. Assume that the risk function is not only related to the volume of each other's
transactions, but also to the level of relationship with each other. A rise in the level of relationship leads to a higher level of trust, at the same
time reducing the uncertainty of the transaction and thus reduces the risk. Meanwhile, a higher level of relationship will increase the
competitiveness of decision makers in the market:  2 2 2 2,      ,ij ij ij ijr ir q j  .
Define the risk function between the Internet financial platform i and the capital demander k as  2 2 2 2,      ,ik ik ik ikr ir q k  . The risk function
between the fund owner h and the internet financial platform i is defined as  1 1 1 1ˆ ,ˆ      ,hi hi h ii hq ir r h  .
It is assumed that the above relationship cost function, relationship level function, transaction cost function, operation risk function, credit
penalty function, and risk function are both convex functions and continuously differentiable.
7.3 Revenue, risk and user stickiness
For the Internet financial platform, there is a need for financial institutions to balance the risks and benefits, and it is also extremely
concerned to maintain contact with users, thereby increasing the user's stickiness of products. Therefore, it has the characteristics of maximizing
profit, minimizing risk and maximizing user stickiness.
Goal 1: Maximize net income
Define ρij
2 as the price of funds transferred from the Internet financial platform i to traditional finance j, which is handled by traditional
finance.
Define ρik
2 as the price of funds directly borrowed from the Internet financial platform i to the capital demander k.
Then the problem of maximizing net income of the Internet financial platform i is expressed as:
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Also meet the conditions
2 21 0, 0, 0      , , ,ij ikhiq q q h i j k   and
2 210 1,0 1,0 1     , , ,ij ikhi h i j k        as well.
Goal 2: Minimize risk
The risk minimization problem of the Internet financial platform i is expressed as:
     2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 12
1 1 1
2 ˆmin , , ,i ij ij ij ik ik
J
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H
i
j k h
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. (7)
Also meet the conditions
2 21 0, 0, 0      , , ,ij ikhiq q q h i j k   and
2 210 1,0 1,0 1     , , ,ij ikhi h i j k        as well.
Goal 3: Maximize user stickiness
The Internet finance platform also attempts to establish and maintain the closest social relationship with other decision makers on the
network. This question is expressed as:
     2 2 2 2 13
1 1 1
2 1ˆmax
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k h
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. (8)
Also meet the condition
2 210 1,0 1,0 1     , , ,ij ikhi h i j k        .
7.4 Network balance analysis
For the multi-dimensional goal of the Internet financial platform i , define Ui as multi-objective decision function, αi as non-negative
risk weight and βi as non-negative relationship weight.
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with the conditions
2 21 0, 0, 0      , , ,ij ikhiq q q h i j k   ,
2 210 1,0 1,0 1     , , ,ij ikhi h i j k        ,
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. The same is true with (28),
which is a strict concave function, therefore we could use variational inequality to represent the equilibrium conditions that satisfy all Internet
financial platforms:
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The variational inequality is used to represent the equilibrium conditions that satisfy all investors as follows:
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The variational inequality is used to represent the equilibrium conditions for meeting traditional financial platforms as follows:
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The variational inequality is used to indicate that the equilibrium conditions for all fund users are as follows:
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financial market reaches equilibrium.
Equilibrium solution existence condition: assuming that there is a positive constant M,N,R, so that
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In summary, the unique condition of the variational inequality equilibrium solution is: assuming that the vector function F in equations (32),
(33), (34), and (35) are strictly monotonic with respect to Q1,Q2,Q3,Q4,Q5,Η1,Η2,Η3,Η4,Η5,ρ4 , then there must be a unique fund streaming
Q1∗ ,Q2∗ ,Q3∗ ,Q4∗ ,Q5∗ and unique social network relationship levels Η1,Η2,Η3,Η4,Η5 and unique demand price vector ρ4∗
satisfying the equilibrium conditions of the entire financial market.
In order to verify the validity of the above-mentioned financial market super-network model, without loss of generality, we have
established a financial super network simulation model with two fund owners, two Internet financial platforms, two traditional financial
platforms and three capital demanders. Using MATLAB to implement the projection dynamic system algorithm, the convergence criterion is that
the difference between the flow rate and price of each layer in the successive iteration process is less than ε = 10−4. After 3187 iterations, the
convergence effect is superior as shown in Figure 7. The good convergence effect verifies the validity of the model.
Consider the optimal equilibrium solution after convergence of the super network model under social network and internet finance as
follows:
 1∗: 11
1∗ = 11.47; 12
1∗ = 11.45; 21
1∗ = 11.47; 22
1∗ = 11.45
 2∗: 11
1∗ = 4.44; 12
1∗ = 4.64; 21
1∗ = 4.44; 22
1∗ = 4.64
 3∗: 11
2∗ = 11.39; 12
2∗ = 0; 21
2∗ = 0; 22
2∗ = 10.49
 4∗: 11
2∗ = 3.31; 12
2∗ = 0; 13
2∗ = 8.24; 21
2∗ = 4.31; 22
2∗ = 8.10; 23
2∗ = 0
 5∗: 11
3∗ = 13.50; 12
3∗ = 0; 13
3∗ = 6.77; 21
3∗ = 0; 22
3∗ = 13.41; 23
3∗ = 6.36 .
The clearance price of all funds invested by the Internet financial platform is
 1
∗ = 294.08; 2
∗ = 293.64
The clearing price of all the funds of the traditional financial platform when investing is:
 1
∗ = 206.09; 2
∗ = 205.65 .
The demand price of the capital demander is:
 1
4∗ = 471.40; 2
4∗ = 471.30; 3
4∗ = 471.38 .
At this time S1
∗
= S2
∗
= 0, there is no capital flowing to the no investment option, which means that the best decision for the fund owner
is to invest all the funds.
It can be seen from Q1∗ = 45.84;Q2∗ = 18.16 that in the Internet financial environment, fund owners invest more in Internet financial
platforms than traditional financial platforms.
For comparative analysis, the adjustment parameters are calculated to obtain the optimal equilibrium solution of the financial super
network without considering the social network relationship level as follows:
 1∗: 11
1∗ = 11.47; 12
1∗ = 11.45; 21
1∗ = 11.47; 22
1∗ = 11.45
 2∗: 11
1∗ = 4.44; 12
1∗ = 4.64; 21
1∗ = 4.44; 22
1∗ = 4.64
 3∗: 11
2∗ = 11.36; 12
2∗ = 0; 21
2∗ = 0; 22
2∗ = 10.47
 4∗: 11
2∗ = 8.24; 12
2∗ = 3.34; 13
2∗ = 0; 21
2∗ = 0; 22
2∗ = 4.32; 23
2∗ = 8.11
 5∗: 11
3∗ = 0; 12
3∗ = 6.76; 13
3∗ = 13.48; 21
3∗ = 13.40; 22
3∗ = 6.35; 23
3∗ = 0 .
Fig. The comparison shows that in both cases, Q1∗ and Q2∗ have no change, and the level of social network relationship has no impact on the overall investment
decision of the fund owner; Q3∗ , Q4∗ and Q5∗ have changes, the level of social network relationship to the Internet financial platform and traditional financial platform
investment Decision making has a certain impact. The direct investment of the Internet financial platform in the capital demand market has declined, and the indirect
investment through the traditional financial platform has increased, indicating that the traditional financial platform, the Internet financial platform, and the social network
relationship of the capital demanders will be strengthened, and the financial market will be more effective.
8. Conclusion and suggestion
The results of Internet Finance subnet show that the main source of systemic risk lies in the external effect of microeconomic risk-laking
activity. That is, the losses imposed on the whole society by a single firm (institution) are far greater than the losses suffered by the investors
themselves. In practical terms, companies with strong power in Internet Finance platforms tend to pay close attention to their own risk
prevention and control. Instead, ordinary Internet Finance platforms that do business directly with these platforms are not paying enough
attention to their own risks. These sections that lie outside of important nodes. Weak enough and not independent enough, regulation without
attention is often the source of risks to Internet Finance. Therefore, for any node in the Internet Finance system, the risk is not to select the node
with the greatest degree of connectivity, but to establish a connection with the node with the largest degree of connectivity. This is enough to
reflect the diffusivity of risk in Internet Finance risk system and the difference between other complex systems.
In addition, the Internet Finance system has a core impact. Internet giants monopolize more user traffic in the market, which makes the
Internet industry with overall long tail risk. Judging from the investor nature of Internet Finance products, most of the investors involved in
Internet Finance products lack the awareness of risk prevention. One of the reasons is that the Internet Finance platform promotes the incentive
mechanism on a large scale, the other is that most of the Internet Finance products ignore the red tape authentication of traditional investment
behavior, thus increasing the core risk of Internet Finance. Therefore, in view of the supervision of Internet Finance, we need to focus on the
large-scale Internet gold. Financial platform business activities. The most hierarchical feature of the Internet Finance system is the regulatory
layer, which has the key to the overall boom or decline of the network. Therefore, the implementation of supervision is an important factor to
control the occurrence of systemic risks in Internet Finance.
Finally, the Internet Finance system has multiple levels of relevance. The systemic risk of Internet Finance has obvious multi-level nature,
which is mainly composed of three layers: supervision layer, Internet Finance inner layer and traditional financial layer. The superposition of
multi-source risk is originated from the inner layer of Internet Finance and infects or induces the systemic risk of traditional financial industry. In
the supervision of the systemic characteristics of Internet Finance, we need to keep any part of the system can not be separated from the whole,
targeted control. Internet Finance systems integrate and change each other to cope with external shocks and endogenous fluctuations. Thus, the
whole system is approximately in a more stable state. Such self-regulation includes small changes, such as the regulatory level through the
continuous optimization of the system to make the entire network to reach a stable state not to be attacked; However, the self-regulation may
also come from a larger vibration, such as the damage of a core node, which results in the loss of most of the network structure, so that the
network will eventually have to stay in a stable state that is much smaller than before. Often the latter regulation is accompanied by the loss of a
large area of nodes, the overall system is weak, the links between nodes have broken, that is to say, the systematic risk of Internet Finance has
occurred.
This paper synthesizes the research literature of different scholars, selects 90 representative risk factors of Internet Finance, and puts
forward the risk contagion network model of Internet Finance with risk factors as nodes. Considering the Internet Finance is a complex system,
for some hard to quantify the risk factor of the problem in the processing, the model has a more intuitive visual ability, help to combine micro
and macro two angles to analyze risk contagion of systemic risk, provide a better basis for the implementation of the regulation means. In
addition, the study of Internet Finance with the theory of complexity science can become a new idea, new method and new approach, so as to
achieve the unification of Internet Finance research on micro and macro level, and provide more powerful support for the supervision of modern
Internet Finance and the detection of potential hidden dangers. The subsequent research can collect the transaction data of commercial Banks
and Internet Finance enterprises for empirical analysis, so as to explore the contagion law of systemic risk.
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